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 Personality testing has received considerable criticism due to validity coefficients being 
weakened by intentional response distortion. The current study investigates whether priming an 
individual with a moral self-reflective prime will reduce faking behavior on personality tests. 
Participants were students who took part in the study through a face-to-face administration group 
or a remote electronic administration group. Using an independent samples design, participants 
were randomly selected into an experimental prime group, a control prime group, or a no-prime 
group. Participants in the experimental groups were expected to display higher counterproductive 
behaviors, lower work ethic, and lower social desirability than participants in the control group 
or no-prime group. Participants in the control group and no-prime group were not expected to 
differ. No significant difference was found for counterproductive behaviors or social desirability 
for either administration groups, but work ethic was significantly lower for the experimental 
group for both administration groups. Potential explanations and implications are discussed. 
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 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In the context of personnel selection, optimism for testing, specifically personality 
testing, has grown due to evidence of criterion-related validity in relation to job performance 
(Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hough & Oswald, 2000; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Tett, 
Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). However, this initial optimism for personality testing is mitigated 
by apprehension towards somewhat weak correlations between personality scores and job 
performance (Morgeson et al., 2007). Despite “faking” (i.e. intentional response distortion or 
impression management) being regarded by some as relatively innocuous (e.g., Ellingson, 
Sackett, & Connelly, 2007; Huws, Reddy, & Talcott, 2009; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996), 
research has shown that individuals can distort responses when motivated to do so (e.g., Hough, 
Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco, 2003; 
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) and decisions based on personality assessments can be affected by 
faking (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). Goffin and Boyd (2009) made suggestions in 
regards to faking: 1) disguised items should not be used due to lower construct validity, and 2) 
previous research has failed to take advantage of the morality element in faking warnings. 
 People gravitate toward a feeling of “rightness” in their actions as a sort of “moral 
mandate” (Skitka & Morgan, 2009). The way in which information is processed in the human 
mind engenders a sense that people are perceiving reality directly, which may explain some of 
this attraction (Burton, 2008). Hogan (1970) proposed that moral functioning is made up of two 
traditions in moral philosophy: the ethics of personal conscience, also known as moral 
intuitionism, and the ethics of social responsibility, also known as moral rationalism. For many 
years, the rationalist approach was the dominant view in the field (i.e., Kohlberg, 1981, 1984); 
however, in recent years the intuitionist approach has cogently challenged that view (Haidt, 
	   	  	   2 
2001). Despite the ambiguity surrounding which approach carries the most weight in decision-
making, it is clear that intuition plays a major role, if not the largest role, in moral functioning. 
 With intuitive decision-making, researchers are typically forced to make inferential 
“leaps of faith” regarding the underlying processes by which decisions are made. Many 
researchers have accepted so-called dual process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), which are 
often distinguished by the names “System 1” and “System 2” (Stanovich & West, 2000). System 
1 is the automatic process (intuition) that generates impressions and tentative judgments that are 
accepted, blocked, or corrected by the controlled processes (analytic) of System 2 (Morewedge 
& Kahneman, 2010). With System 1 being identified with associative memory (Lieberman et al., 
2002), Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) suggested using research on the priming paradigm to 
explain the phenomena of intuitive judgment and how the spread of activation in associative 
memory is represented. In relation to dishonest behavior, Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008a) 
successfully used a form of moral priming to deter dishonest behavior, but did so with the intent 
of increasing attention to one’s own moral standards, a mechanism that falls under the self-
concept maintenance theory. 
 Individuals are often torn between two competing motivations: reaping benefits via 
cheating and dishonest behavior versus maintaining a positive self-concept through honesty 
(Aronson 1969; Harris, Mussen, & Rutherford, 1976). People solve moral dilemmas by 
maintaining equilibrium in such a way that gains are made from dishonest behavior while a 
positive self-concept is maintained (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008a). In other words, people can 
take part in dishonest behavior without ever having to confront the morality of their actions. One 
mechanism that supports the role of self-concept maintenance is “attention to standards,” which 
is based on Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory of objective self-awareness. With a reflection of 
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dishonest behavior in one’s self-concept, people should be more likely to adhere to a stricter 
criterion of moral behavior. Once again, Mazar et al. (2008a) demonstrated this by reminding 
participants of honesty standards before administering a paper-and-pencil test, a tactic that led to 
lower accounts of cheating. 
 Research has suggested that overt tests are preferable to disguised tests when trying to 
deter faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009); thus, in order to maintain construct validity, a solution that 
involves overt testing is in dire need. In Goffin and Boyd’s (2009) proposed decision tree for the 
thought processes underlying faking, the first question asks whether faking would violate the test 
taker’s moral code. As morality factors heavily into the decision of whether to fake or not, and is 
largely made up of intuitive decision-making (Haidt, 2010), priming techniques should 
effectively alter behavior (e.g., Bargh & Williams, 2006). However, as moral functioning is 
largely comprised of two parts (moral intuitionism and moral rationalism), similar to how 
decision making is composed (System 1 and System 2), priming may not solely cover the 
rationalism/System 2 portion or moral decision making. Therefore, use of a self-awareness 
technique may affect a person’s “rationalism” or willingness to perform behavior that would 
clearly transgress societal norms (Diener & Wallbom, 1976). In the present study, it was 
hypothesized that priming with a form of moral self-awareness would affect the intuitionistic and 
rationalistic sides of decision making and therefore, affect faking behavior. 
Tests and Faking 
The purpose of applicant testing is simple: testing saves money. The savings occur when 
workers selected by valid tests are more productive than workers selected by less efficient 
methods (Brogden, 1949).  The extent of the economic benefit is contingent on two factors: (1) 
the percentage of applicants who must be chosen, and (2) the effectiveness of the selection 
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instruments in predicting efficiency on the job. The effectiveness of these tests has received 
considerable attention, with significant effort being devoted to developing tests that will produce 
the highest possible validity in certain contexts. Among these tests, the use of personality 
measures to explain organizational behavior has increased over the past twenty years (George, 
1992; Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; 
Hough & Ones, 2001; Hough & Schneider, 1996; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Dilchert, 2005). 
 The reemergence of personality measures as a viable option in personnel selection is due 
in large part to research supporting their validity in these contexts (Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, 
& Judge, 2007). Personality constructs have been shown to be useful in understanding and 
predicting attitudes, behaviors, performance, and outcomes in organizational settings (Ones et 
al., 2007). The simplicity and relatively low cost of administering personality measures, as well 
as lower adverse impact in comparison with other selection instruments (Hough, Oswald, & 
Ployhart, 2001), enhances their appeal. A plethora of evidence suggests that personality scores 
are useful predictors of job performance across occupations (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; 
Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; Borman, Penner, Allen, & Motowidlo, 2001; Ones & 
Viswesvaran, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991), 
and may enhance utility (e.g., Ones et al., 2007; Viswesvaran, Deller, & Ones, 2007). However, 
concerns have been raised regarding the validity coefficients being too low for practical use in 
personnel selection due to intentional response distortion (Morgeson et al., 2007). 
The Issue of Response Distortion 
Faking (i.e. intentional response distortion or impression management) occurs when an 
individual strategically creates a dishonest presentation of the self when undergoing 
psychological testing (Grieve & Mahar, 2010). Significant research suggests that faking occurs 
	   	  	   5 
during personnel selection (Griffith & Peterson, 2006; Morgeson et al., 2007; Tett & 
Christiansen, 2007; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), with an estimated 30 -50% of job applicants 
engaging in intentional response distortion (Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). What is far 
less agreed upon, however, is whether faking reflects a social skill (Rosse et al., 1998; 
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), something irrelevant (Ones et al., 2007; Ones, Viswesvaran, & 
Reiss, 1996), or a shameful lie (Tett & Christiansen, 2007). What we do know is that, first, the 
effects of distortion usually differ across settings, meaning that lab studies of directed faking are 
affected by instructions to fake while real-life situations are not affected in the same way (Ones 
et al., 2007). Lab studies can circumvent this problem by avoiding the use of directed faking, 
where instructions to fake direct one group of participants to fake in contrast to a non-faking 
group. Second, faking affects the rank ordering of candidates in top-down selection (Mueller-
Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). Response distortion subverts the entire purpose of 
content-driven personnel selection and instead leads to the hiring of applicants who are 
especially skilled in impression management rather than skilled on the intended attribute on 
which they are being tested (Shoss & Strube, 2011). Third, despite disagreement in the past, 
faking appears unrelated to the criterion-related validity of personality assessments in field 
settings (Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). With overwhelming evidence in support of the criterion 
validity of personality measures (Hough & Oswald, 2008; Ones et al., 2007; Tett & Christiansen, 
2007), personality scores do predict job performance. Fourth, faking impairs the construct-
related validity of personality assessment (Ballenger, Caldwell-Andrews, & Baer, 2001; Pauls & 
Crost, 2005; Topping & O’Gorman, 1997).  
 In light of evidence that applicants are capable of faking in situations when it is 
advantageous to do so (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), what 
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alternatives have been developed to counteract or subvert the effects of faking? Alternate 
approaches have been suggested as a way of reducing response distortion including elaboration 
on self-report responses (Schmitt & Kunce, 2002), using forced-choice item formats (Heggestad, 
Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, 2006) and conditional reasoning tests (CRTs; LeBreton, Barksdale, 
Robin, & James, 2007). With the latter of those approaches, CRTs are designed to indirectly 
measure implicit biases and rationalizations linked to various latent motives (LeBreton, 
Barksdale, Robin, & James, 2007), therefore, hoping to measure personality from a different 
angle. However, in terms of reducing faking, using disguised items such as the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway & McKinley, 1989), the California Personality 
Inventory (Gough, 2000), and the Personnel Reaction Blank (Gough, 1971) is not a suggested 
solution due to lower construct validity (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Holden & Jackson, 1985). 
 As faking undermines the validity of personality tests (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 
2006), the next step entails understanding what drives this behavior. An early model proposed by 
Snell, Sydell, and Lueke (1999) identified “ability to fake” and “motivation to fake” as two 
independent factors that affect an individual’s tendency to intentionally distort responses. In the 
interest of creating a decision-making model that takes into account ability and motivation to 
fake, several proposed models have elaborated on Snell et al.’s (1999) initial model (e.g. 
McFarland & Ryan, 2000; 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Adding to the previous models, 
Goffin and Boyd (2009) proposed a model of faking where motivation is a function of individual 
differences and contextual antecedents. Individuals then continue with the decision process of 
whether or not to fake on a particular item by working their way through a “decision tree” (see 
Figure 1; Goffin & Boyd, 2009) that involves determining whether (a) faking violates the 
participants’ moral code, (b) the item response is job-related, (c) the behavior or tendency in the 
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item is characteristic of the participant, (d) the behavior or tendency in the item is advantageous 
to the job, (e) the faking would lead to not being hired, and (f) the individual can demonstrate the 
behavior or tendency on the job. Therefore, according to this model, whether faking would 
violate the moral code of a participant is the first process that enters one’s mind when debating 
impression management. If the model behind faking is indeed sequential, then creating a barrier 
with morality should quell the decision-making process of response distortion before it even 
begins.  
Figure 1 
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Morality and Decision Making 
Making fair and accurate judgments requires relevant information to be available, 
information that individuals sometimes don’t have or don’t attend to. Due to this, judgments are 
influenced by the surrounding context that governs which intuitions come to the fore and which 
reasons seem reasonable. Since research has supported that judgments are easily manipulated 
(Stanovich, 1996), human beings are attracted to processes that make them feel as if they 
perceive reality more directly (Burton, 2008). With human information processing, people are 
able to make rapid interpretations and inferences without all of the information while 
maintaining a moral mandate, or a feeling of “rightness” (Skitka & Morgan, 2009). 
According to Kohlberg’s (1963, 1964, 1969) theory of moral development, individuals go 
through a transformational process of moral maturity ultimately ending with an individual who is 
concerned with the justice and universal laws that can be applied to everyone, breaking the rules 
only if they are not applicable to their perception of justice. Rest et al. (1999) continued 
Kohlberg’s work by developing a model that was additive, meaning instead of replacing lower 
levels of moral reasoning with higher levels, the stages accumulate into a person who is morally 
self-aware. Moral reasoning, a component of moral functioning, dominated the field for years 
with philosophers agreeing that deliberation reflected a sign of mature decision making (Haidt, 
2001). However, intuitionists have challenged this approach in recent years stating that judgment 
is essentially quick and effortless and is guided by emotion-based heuristics (Narvaez, 2010a). 
Moral Rationalism and Moral Intuition 
For much of the 20th century, the functioning of morality was emphasized by rationalism, 
with judgments only being considered moral if moral criteria were applied through deliberation 
(Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983; Narvaez, 2010a). Relating back to Kohlberg (1981), these 
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judgments are made at the most sophisticated level of reasoning known as post-conventional 
reasoning. Rest et al. (1999) state that post-conventional reasoning is characterized by quick 
perspective taking that includes an expectation of reciprocity between the individual and the law. 
With this view, post-conventional thinking reflects more mature moral functioning than pre-
conventional thinking, meaning post-conventional thinking allows the individual to take a step 
back from his or her own interests and consider more inclusive and holistic forms of cooperation 
(Narvaez, 2010a). The rationalist approach demonstrates that deliberation changes with 
experience and age (e.g., Piaget, 1932/1965), illustrating that individuals are not caged by their 
socialization and are able to question social norms while creating new ones (Narvaez, 2010a). 
However, this approach has been criticized for being locked in the principle of moral 
phenomenalism (the need for moral cognition to be conscious), which consequently excludes 
majority of human behavior from examination (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; Narvaez, 2010a).  
Since the beginning of the study of psychology, it has been apparent that individuals 
access a large portion of knowledge without phenomenological awareness (Bargh, 1989). This 
knowledge also transcends the individual’s ability to verbally articulate (e.g., Kihlstrom, Shames, 
& Dorfman, 1996), meaning that significant knowledge lies outside of conscious awareness. 
Using the intuitionist approach, moral judgment is the outcome of quick, automatic evaluations 
(i.e., intuitions; Haidt, 2001). In this regard, decisions regarding morality involve nonconscious 
pattern recognition accompanied by high levels of affective valence, meaning that reasoning 
would be considered a post-hoc attribution (Monin, Pizzaro, & Beer, 2007) creating a false 
impression of control (Dane & Pratt, 2009). When reasoning does follow, it is used primarily to 
rationalize an intuition. Thus, reasoning may or may not follow intuitive decision-making (Haidt 
& Bjorklund, 2008). The study of intuition in morality has culminated in significant evidence 
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indicating that much of human information processing takes place automatically, including 
processes leading up to moral action (e.g. Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). 
However, the intuitionist perspective has been criticized for oversimplifying moral functioning 
(e.g. Appiah, 2008; Blasi, 2009; Narvaez, 2008; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Saltztein & Kasachkoff, 
2004). Narvaez (2010a) criticized the intuitionist approach on the grounds that it (a) is imprecise 
in its definition of intuition when distinctions are made, (b) is simplistic by overlooking the 
complexities of moral life, (c) overlooks research support for reasoning and deliberation, and (d) 
equates enculturation with virtue.  
To summarize, moral functioning is far more complex than any intuitionist or rationalist 
viewpoint can hope to explain. Each of these paradigms is lacking, with the rationalist approach 
neglecting implicit processes and the intuitionist approach ignoring the complex interplays 
between various functions of the brain (Narvaez, 2010a). Narvaez (2010a) proposed a concept 
known as moral imagination that involves intuition and reasoning in higher order functioning by 
having a person work through dramatic rehearsals of alternate actions and outcomes. The more 
morally imaginative a person is, the more fluent he or she is in making accurate evaluations from 
a large bank of possibilities. Under this concept, moral intuitions are malleable to reasoning, but 
at the same time, reasoning can be altered by intuition. This deliberation allows for “self-
authorship” (Baxter Magolda, 2001), allowing the person to step back from a response in the 
face of injustice and question whether an alternative course of action is necessary. In fact, 
school-based programs in social and emotional learning are designed to teach students to avoid 
rapid emotional responses by examining their actions more carefully (e.g., Elias et al., 2008) and 
increasing their cognitive capabilities in decision-making (e.g. Catalano et al., 2008), which in 
turn allow individuals to monitor their intuitions (Narvaez, 2010a). 
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However, in response to Narvaez (2010a), Haidt (2010) claims that Narvaez’s idea of 
moral function being equal parts intuition and rationalism is far fetched according to previous 
research. To clarify, Haidt elaborates on the three debates of partnership between reasoning and 
intuition. The first debate, reasoning as a senior partner, is essentially Kohlberg’s (1963, 1964, 
1969) view that reasoning drives emotions to moral behavior. The second debate, equal 
partnership, is Narvaez’s view, claiming, “intuition danced with conscious reasoning, taking 
turns doing the leading” (Narvaez, 2008, p. 235). The third argument, intuition as a senior 
partner, is Haidt’s view, and states that reasoning is present but intuition drives the majority of 
moral behavior. Haidt (2010) explains that no one has found a method to teach people to actively 
seek alternate viewpoints after formulating one’s first intuition, as proposed by Narvaez (2010a), 
particularly if measurement of the criterion for success takes place outside the context in which 
the teaching took place (Willingham, 2007). Problems with reducing biases have also been a 
persistent problem (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009). Haidt (2010) goes on to argue that 
because human behavior is largely directed by automatic processes, easier and more effective 
interventions are possible by altering social contexts, triggering concerns of accountability, or 
activating other unconscious processes (e.g., Ariely, 2008) as opposed to teaching people 
“rationalist” decision-making skills. Narvaez (2010b), responded simply by saying that 
conscious deliberation is the guiding hand in ensuring that things do not fall flat, and with 
modern moral psychology’s roots growing from the study of cooperation, perhaps we should 
return to the study of these complexities. While the debate regarding which bridge best handles 
the traffic remains open, it is apparent that intuition plays an important role in moral functioning, 
if not the biggest role. 
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Intuitive Decision Making and Priming 
Intuitions have been defined as “affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, 
nonconscious, and holistic associations” (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 40). In recent years, intuition 
research has experienced a resurgence due to many notable advances (e.g., Glöckner & 
Witteman, 2010a; Plessner, Betsch, Schallies, & Schwieren, 2008). Researchers have learned 
about intuition and its power to integrate massive amounts of complex information (e.g., Betsch, 
Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig 2001; Dijksterhuis, 2004), its malleable efficiency (e.g., 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999), its guiding foresight for the decision-maker (e.g., Bowers, Regehrs, 
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Metcalfe, 1986), its deep correlation with affect (e.g., Baumann & 
Kuhl, 2002; Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003), and its many shortcomings (e.g., Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). However, according to Liberman (2000), 
intuition is best regarded as mysterious and unexplainable. Catty and Halberstadt (2008, p.295) 
stated that intuition is still the “black box of modern psychology” due to little being known about 
the underlying cognitive and affective processes that lead to intuitive hunches. With so much of 
intuitive functioning being unknown, there are some aspects that have generated unanimous 
agreement. 
For starters, there is increasing evidence that intuitive judgments, which are far from 
unmediated, initiate from preexisting knowledge that is activated in memory and may guide 
conscious decision-making without ever being consciously retrieved (e.g., Bastick, 1982; 
Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Dorfman, Shames, & 
Kihlstrom, 1996; Goschke, 1997; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005; Kahneman, 2003; Kihlstrom, 
1987; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Perrig & Wippich, 1995; Volz & von Cramon, 2006; Yaniv & 
Meyer, 1987). As summarized by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), intuitive judgments tend to 
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be holistic and are based on reactions to specific cues (e.g. recognition). Also, there is almost 
unanimous agreement that intuition is shaped by learning (Hogarth, 2010; Seligman, 1970). 
Intuitions formed from learning appear to be quite accurate across the life cycle and hardly vary 
in relation to individual differences (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984; Zacks & Hasher, 2002; see 
also earlier). On top of all of that, decision-making literature has shown that emotional states 
affect judgments of things such as risk and probability (e.g., Isen, 1993; Loewenstein, Weber, 
Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Of specific interest, priming of emotions can have important effects on 
judgment outcomes (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008a, 2008b; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004). 
Despite empirical progress, intuition is continually treated as a unitary construct (e.g., 
Ambady, 2010; Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010). Hogarth (2010) urged that research 
needed to focus on identifying the different types of intuition and classify the different 
mechanisms in order to progress in understanding unconscious functioning. While some 
researchers have claimed that different types of intuition are in relation to either intuitive 
outcome or intuitive process (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2009; Glöckner & Witteman, 2010b; Sadler-
Smith, 2008, 2010; Sinclair, 2010), Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) state that a more integrative 
approach is needed that encompasses both outcomes and processes. Dane and Pratt (2007) noted 
that a common misconception in intuition research is for intuitive processes and associated 
outcomes to be called “intuition.” They suggested that it would be better to refer to intuition in 
terms of its process (i.e. mechanisms and processes) and its outcome (types of intuition). 
Mechanisms will be discussed later on, so first, the three different types of intuition will be 
reviewed: problem- solving, creativity, moral judgment (Dane & Pratt, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Klein, 
2003; Reynolds, 2006; Sinclair, 2010; Sonenschein, 2007) 
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The Different Types of Intuition 
Problem-solving intuition is defined as expertise-based, domain-specific responses to 
tightly structured problems based on nonconscious processing of information, triggered 
automatically, activating correspondence of complex patterns of multiple cues against prototypes 
and scripts held within long-term memory (Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011). Dane and Pratt (2009) 
described problem-solving intuition as pattern matching “honed through repeated training and 
practice” (2009, p. 5). This type of intuition is typically deployed by experts in a particular 
domain to deal with tightly specified problems. Creative intuition on the other hand is slow-
forming, affectively charged judgments that occur in advance of insight, combining knowledge 
in novel ways based on divergent associations (Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011). This type of 
intuition is the “gut feelings” that are the result of subjective experience to phenomena. The 
major difference between creative intuition and problem-solving intuition is that the latter does 
not necessarily combine knowledge in novel ways, but instead rely upon the matching of an 
observed response to a prototype stored in long-term memory (Salas et al., 2010).  Therefore, the 
difference is that creative, unlike problem-solving, is divergent instead of convergent (Dane & 
Pratt, 2009).  
Last but not least is moral intuition, which is defined as automatic, rapid, affect-based 
judgments, arrived at nonconsciously, that are in response to an ethical dilemma (Haidt, 2001). 
The concept of moral intuition, drawn from Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model of moral 
judgment, involves nonconscious pattern matching which comes with a relatively high level of 
affective charge. With this, reasoning is a post hoc attribution (Monin, Pizzaro, & Beer, 2007), 
which creates an “illusion of control” (Dane & Pratt, 2009) due to individuals ascribing their 
moral judgments and behaviors to rationality, but are instead due to “emotion-backed” intuitions 
	   	  	   15 
(Sonenschein, 2007). According to Hauser (2006), moral intuitions generate from culturally 
variable moral systems, operating on universal sets of principles, honed by a set of moral norms 
based on prototypes. Normative moral judgment is thought to involve exchange between the 
reflexive pattern-matching X-system and the pensive, conscious reasoning C-system (Salvador & 
Folger, 2007) discovered by Lieberman, Jarcho, and Satpute (1994) (Gore & Sadler-Smith, 
2011). In terms of moral intuition, the X-system functions on the support of moral prototypes 
that, depending on whether the results are a match or mismatch, may be further processed by the 
C-system (Reynolds, 2006). This X-system and C-system sounds very similar to the dual-
processing system commonly referred to in the decision-making literature. 
Dual-Processing Systems and Associative Memory 
Among behavioral and brain scientists, a view that two separate systems underlie human 
thinking, reasoning, and decision-making is the dominant approach (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
Within the dual-processing framework, reasoning and thinking are partitioned between the titles 
of “System 1” and “System 2” (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). The evolutionarily more 
ancient of the two systems, System 1 (Evans, 2003), is governed by rapid, parallel, and automatic 
core processes that permit judgment in the absence of conscious reasoning (Epstein, 1994; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). The more recent of the two systems, System 2, is governed by slower, 
serial, and effortful core processes that permit hypothetical thinking and conscious abstract 
reasoning (see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Evans, 2008; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Wilson, 
Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000). Dual-system models of reasoning attribute errors in judgment to 
two problems: faulty intuition is generated by the automatic functions of System 1, which fail to 
be detected or corrected by the controlled operations of System 2. Intuition is identified as a 
System 1 process (Stanovich & West, 2000), which is identified with the automatic operations of 
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associative memory (Lieberman et al., 2002). Associative memory is defined as “a network of 
long-term memory for semantic information, emotions, and goals that is governed by the spread 
of activation, as determined by the strengths of interconnecting weights (associations)” 
(Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010, p. 435). 
Priming in Relation to Associative Memory 
A real breakthrough in understanding associative memory and its structure took place 
when studies of social judgment began to explore the underpinnings of accessibility in the 
priming paradigm (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Probes of the 
structure of memory were neither random nor restricted to logical relations, but instead, were 
guided by specific hypotheses as to the governing rules of the spread of activation in associative 
memory (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). Generally speaking, research on priming has 
illustrated links that connect emotions, verbal representations, motor responses, visual 
perception, facial expressions, and conscious/unconscious goals (Förster & Liberman, 2007). For 
example, holding a cup of warm coffee increases the likelihood of perceiving a stranger’s 
personality as warm (Williams & Bargh, 2008). In simple terms, judgments can be thought of as 
weighted combinations of bits of information, where biases can be described as an overweighting 
of certain aspects while other aspects are underweighted or neglected, relative to a criterion of 
accuracy (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Therefore, according to Morewedge and Kahneman 
(2010), strongly activated information is likely to be given more weight than it deserves while 
other relevant knowledge that is not activated will be underweighted or neglected (e.g., 
Mussweiler, 2007; Weber & Johnson, 2006). 
Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) went on to say that the specifications for their 
understanding of intuition and associative memory were drawn from studies of priming. In their 
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view, evidence of the priming paradigm implies that activation spreading selectively within 
associative memory creates and maintains a coherent and fairly precise representation of the 
current situation, as well as providing links to the past and possible future. With so much 
emphasis being placed on using priming to understand intuition and associative memory, it 
would be best to first gain a better understanding of what priming is. Priming consists of 
presenting some stimulus with the intention of activating a specific idea, category, or feeling and 
then measuring the effects of the prime on performance (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 
2012). Due to the human mind being organized as networks of associations, activating a specific 
idea will spontaneously draw to mind associated thoughts, memories, and feelings. Priming plays 
the role of mapping the networks of associations for an individual, since different primes activate 
different associative links for different people (Cameron et al., 2012).  
Priming techniques were initially developed to study implicit social cognition. The use of 
sequential priming tasks to measure individual differences in racial attitudes, reported by Fazio 
and colleagues (1995), accelerated research in the area. Fazio and colleagues (1995) research 
illustrated that priming could be used as a valid predictor of human behavior in areas where 
people are typically motivated to control the overt expressions of attitudes (Cameron et al., 
2012). Despite the overzealous excitement over this new tool, priming has been shown to suffer 
from psychometric limitations, specifically low reliability (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; 
Fazio & Olson, 2003). With controversial alternatives attempting to take the place of priming 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), recent innovations have been shown to improve the 
reliability in priming tasks. Two changes that greatly increase reliability are measuring accuracy 
and evaluations of ambiguous stimuli, instead of measuring reaction times (Cameron et al., 
2012). Together with recent improvements in reliability, Cameron et al.’s (2012) comprehensive 
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meta-analysis of 167 studies found that priming techniques function well as measures of implicit 
social cognition. 
Going back to the idea of moral intuition, the question must be asked whether or not 
priming a person with “morality” will ultimately affect behavior. As has already been reviewed, 
moral intuition operates on a dual-processing system in a very similar way to the dual-processing 
system of decision-making. On top of that, Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) explained that 
biases in intuitive judgments come from the areas of associative memory, which is the area under 
which the priming paradigm functions. In Mazar et al.’s (2008a) experiment, a moral “reminder” 
was used to deter respondents from cheating on a test. More specifically, the experiment had 
respondents recall the Ten Commandments before an assessment in order to increase the 
respondent’s “attention to standards”, a concept that falls within the self-concept maintenance 
theory (which will be discussed shortly). It is possible to consider the Ten Commandments 
reminder as “priming” (Mazar et al., 2008a), which means that the results, which demonstrated a 
lower cheating rate for the Ten Commandments recall task, could be due to the prime affecting 
the associative memory/intuition area of System 1 decision-making. However, Mazar et al. 
(2008a) is inclined to believe that the deterrence of dishonest behavior is due to an increase in 
attention of standards, which is possibly linked more to the System 2 area of decision-making. 
Either way, it would be beneficial to further examine this self-concept maintenance theory. 
Self-Concept Maintenance and Self-Awareness 
The standard economic model of rational and selfish human behavior is the belief that 
people take part in dishonest acts consciously and deliberatively by trading off the expected 
external benefits and costs of the dishonest act (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1968). This 
standard external cost-benefit perspective creates three theories as to what is expected to increase 
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the magnitude and frequency of dishonesty: higher magnitude of external rewards, lower 
probability of being caught, and lower magnitude of punishment (Mazar et al., 2008a). People 
have been shown to internalize the norms and values of their society (Campbell 1964; Henrich et 
al., 2001), which act as benchmarks to compare his or her behavior against. Compliance with the 
internal values system provides positive rewards, which based on brain imaging studies, activate 
the same primary reward centers in the brain as external benefits (Knutson et al. 2001; 
O’Doherty et al., 2002). Mazar et al. (2008a) went on to propose that one major way behavior is 
controlled by this internal reward system is by how a person perceives him or herself, also 
known as self-concept (Aronson, 1969). 
People committing dishonest behavior are often torn between two competing 
motivations: gaining from cheating versus maintaining a positive self-concept through honesty 
(Aronson, 1969; Harris, Mussen, & Rutherford 1976).  Typically, people solve this dilemma by 
finding a balance or equilibrium between the two motivations, such that they still gain the 
benefits from behaving dishonestly while at the same time maintaining their self-concept of 
being honest. One mechanism that can be used to allow people to find this equilibrium is known 
as attention to standards (Mazar et al., 2008a). Under the failure of this mechanism, people can 
take part in actions without ever confronting the moral meaning of their actions. The attention 
people pay to their own standards of conduct is closely related to Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) 
theory of objective self-awareness (Mazar et al., 2008a). 
The original objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) assumed that the 
orientation of conscious attention was the essence of self-evaluation. Self-evaluations, or 
focusing on the self, bring about an automatic comparison of the self against standards (Silvia & 
Duval, 2001). The self is broadly defined as the knowledge of oneself while a standard is defined 
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as a “mental representation of correct, behavior, attitudes, and traits. All of the standards of 
correctness taken together define what a “correct” person is” (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, pp. 3- 
4). Attempting to change one’s standards to match one’s actions is referred to as “moral 
hypocrisy” (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997), which is specifically 
defined as the “motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of actually being 
moral” (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999, p. 526). Batson et al. 
(1999) asked participants to decide whether to assign another participant to work on a positive or 
neutral task. A self-awareness manipulation was included in which a mirror was added to the 
room and participants were told that adding another participant to a positive consequence task 
was perceived as being more morally right. Batson et al. (1999) found that high self-awareness 
increased the proportion who assigned the other participant to the positive task. 
In addition, Mazar et al. (2008a) have claimed that people who attend to their own moral 
standards are more likely to have their dishonest behaviors reflected in their self-concept, which 
will cause adherence to stricter rules for delineation of honesty/dishonesty. However, if people 
are inattentive to their own moral standards, their actions will not be compared to any set 
standards, causing behavior to diverge from their standards. Therefore, “attention to standards” 
predicts that when standards of morality are more accessible, people will need to confront the 
meaning of their actions, thus being more honest. In Mazar et al.’s (2008a) study, two task 
conditions were created to compare the performance of respondents in the control group, in 
which no opportunity to be dishonest was present, with that of the respondents in the “cheating” 
group, in which dishonesty was possible. In the first task, respondents were asked to write down 
in two minutes either the names of ten books they have read in high school (no moral reminder) 
or the Ten Commandments (moral reminder). In the second, respondents were given a test sheet 
	   	  	   21 
and an answer sheet. The test sheet consisted of 20 matrices, each based on 12 digit numbers, in 
which the respondents had four minutes to find two numbers per matrix that added up to 10. This 
allowed for the student to unambiguously evaluate whether they had solved the problem. At the 
end of the session, students were promised that two randomly selected participants would receive 
$10 for each set of matrices that was solved. Results showed that despite the type of reminder 
having no effect on performance, respondents who were given the book recall task cheated more 
than respondents who were given the Ten Commandments recall task. In fact, cheating was 
eliminated completely in the Ten Commandments recall task. 
The Present Study 
The present research strives to find an applicable solution for impression management on 
personality tests as well as advance the current research on test faking. To summarize everything 
that has been explained thus far, if Goffin and Boyd’s (2009) decision making tree for faking is 
correct and the decision process is linear, then setting up a moral “deterrent” should divert faking 
behavior in the early stages, similar to that seen in Mazar et al.’s (2008a) study. However, the 
decision making process is far more complex than this study could possibly hope to illustrate and 
far more variables, moderators, etc. would affect the linearity of Goffin and Boyd’s (2009) 
model than their studies could possibly hope to illustrate. With that said, research has supported 
the idea that decisions are made through two processes (Haidt, 2010; Narvaez, 2010a): an 
automatic, intuitive process, which is likely responsible for the majority of moral decision-
making (Haidt, 2010), and a rationalistic, reasoning process. Mazar et al.’s (2008a) self-concept 
theory, based off Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) self-awareness theory, essentially operates off of 
the rationalistic process by encouraging participants to draw attention to their own standards and 
avoid moral hypocrisy. By creating a priming measure (which also operates off the associative 
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memory functions of intuition; Cameron et al., 2012) that will affect the intuitive processes of 
decision making, faking should be halted at the first hurdle of the decision making process 
(morality), according to Goffin and Boyd (2009). If the intuitive processes do not deter faking 
behavior, the rationalistic processes in the self-concept theory should activate self-reflection and 
limit moral hypocrisy if the participant is morally inclined. In sum, the act of priming 
participants with a moral self-reflective measure is expected to decrease faking behavior. Thus, 
with regard to the remote electronic administration group it is expected that participants in the 
experimental (moral prime) group will answer more candidly (i.e., honestly) than those in the 
control (placebo prime) group, resulting in higher scores on the Counterproductive Student 
Behavior Scale and lower scores on the Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile and the Social 
Desirability Scale. Thus, it is proposed that 
Hypothesis 1: Experimental group scores on the Counterproductive Student Behavior 
Scale, Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile, and Social Desirability Scale will display 
less intentional response distortion than corresponding scores on these measures in the 
no-prime group. 
Exposure to the placebo prime is not expected to influence participants’ responses to any of the 
measures. Thus, it is anticipated that scores in the control (placebo prime) group will be 
comparable to those in the no-prime group. Hence,   
Hypothesis 2: Control group scores on the Counterproductive Student Behavior Scale, 
Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile, and Social Desirability Scale will not differ from 
corresponding scores on these measures in the no-prime group. 
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Due to the innocuous nature of the placebo prime, it is expected that exposure to this prime will 
not influence the nature of participants’ responses, whereas exposure to the moral prime will 
encourage participants to respond more truthfully. Thus,    
Hypothesis 3: Experimental group scores on the Counterproductive Student Behavior 
Scale, Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile, and Social Desirability Scale will display 
less intentional response distortion than corresponding scores on these measures in the 
control group. 
The same trends are expected for the face-to-face administration group, as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: In the face-to-face administration group, experimental group scores on the 
Counterproductive Student Behavior Scale, Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile, and 
Social Desirability Scale will display less intentional response distortion than 
corresponding scores on these measures in the no-prime group. 
Hypothesis 5: In the face-to-face administration group, control group scores on the 
Counterproductive Student Behavior Scale, Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile, and 
Social Desirability Scale will not differ from corresponding scores on these measures in 
the no-prime group. 
Hypothesis 6: In the face-to-face administration group, experimental group scores on the 
Counterproductive Student Behavior Scale, Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile, and 
Social Desirability Scale will display less intentional response distortion than 
corresponding scores on these measures in the control group. 
 CHAPTER II: METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 869 students at a university in the southeastern United States. 
Participants received course credit in exchange for completion of the study. The sample was 
primarily female (70.6%) and Caucasian (73.8%), with 17.5% of participants identifying as 
African American, 2.9% as Asian, and 7% as Hispanic or Latino. The mean age of participants 
was 18.8 years, with ages ranging from 17 to 35. The majority of participants were in their first 
(77.2%) or second (16.7%) year of study, although third year (4.5%), fourth year (1.5%), and 
fifth year (.1%) students were also present in the sample.  
Procedure 
Due to Norman et al.’s (2010) finding that the pattern of responses differed by mode of 
administration, participants were randomly assigned to either a face-to-face administration group 
(n = 337) or a remote electronic administration group (n = 532). Within each of those groups, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three subgroups: an experimental group (n = 114 
for face-to-face administration; n = 185 for remote electronic administration), a control group (n 
= 113 for face-to-face administration; n = 181 for remote electronic administration), or a “no-
prime” group (n = 110 for face-to-face administration; n = 166 for remote electronic 
administration). All three groups completed the same series of personality measures. The no-
prime group completed only the series of personality measures while both the experimental 
group and the control group completed a priming instrument first and then completed the 
personality measures. The experimental group completed the moral self-reflective prime 
instrument while the control group completed a placebo prime instrument.  
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Measures 
Priming Measure. In an effort to affectively charge participants in the experimental group 
with moral standards and introspection, a moral self-reflective priming measure was used. This 
priming measure consisted of eight items that ask participants to select from a group of 15 
characteristics (i.e. honest, selfish, self-centered, etc.) those that best answer questions such as 
“What are some of the characteristics of a person who lies or deceives people?” and “What are 
some good examples of moral characteristics?” The priming measure is displayed in Appendix 
A. Participants in the control group were given a placebo priming measure that also consisted of 
eight items that are similar in format to the experimental prime. The placebo priming measure is 
displayed in Appendix B. 
Social Desirability Scale. The Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17; Stöber, 2001) was 
used to assess social desirability. This measure consists of 17 items that reflect the propensity to 
respond in a manner that reflects favorably on oneself (e.g., “I never hesitate to help someone in 
case of emergency”; “When I have made a promise, I keep it – no ifs, ands or buts.”). 
Participants were asked to read each statement carefully and indicate whether each statement 
describes them by providing a true or false response. This scale demonstrated an internal 
consistency of .62 in the remote electronic administration group and .64 in the face-to-face 
administration group. 
Counterproductive Student Behavior Scale. The Counterproductive Student Behavior 
Scale (CSBS; Rimkus, 2012) was used to measure counterproductive behavior in students. This 
measure is comprised of 58 questions that assess the propensity to engage in a range of 
counterproductive student behaviors. For the purposes of this study, 18 items from the following 
five subscales of the CSBS were used: cheating/plagiarism (11 items), deviant behavior (3 
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items), alcohol use (1 item), laziness (2 items), and lying (1 item). Respondents answered these 
items using a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from “Never” to “Every day.” The subscale of 
cheating/plagiarism displayed an internal consistency of .85 in the remote electronic 
administration group and .88 in the face-to-face administration group. Reliability coefficients 
were not computed for the other subscales due to the scarcity of items in each of the subscales. 
Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile (MWEP). The Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile 
Short Form (MWEP-SF; Meriac, Woehr, Gorman, & Thomas, 2013) was used to measure work 
ethic. This measure consists of 28 items that assess seven distinct components of work ethic (4 
items each): (1) centrality of work, (2) self-reliance, (3) hard work, (4) leisure, (5) 
morality/ethics, (6) delay of gratification, and (7) wasted time. Items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  This measure 
displayed an internal consistency of .88 in the remote electronic administration group and .84 in 
the face-to-face administration group. 
Analyses 
SPSS version 21 for Mac was used for all statistical analyses. One-way analyses of 
variance were used to test the effect of group membership on the MWEP and SDS-17 scores, 
with Fisher’s LSD tests being used for pairwise comparisons. As the skewness and kurtosis for 
the CSBS scores were extreme, especially in the no-prime group, the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test was used to compare groups on the CSBS with Wilcoxon rank-sum tests being used 
for pairwise comparisons. These analyses were conducted separately for the online sample and 
the face-to-face sample.  
 CHAPTER III: RESULTS 
Remote Electronic Administration Group 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect overall CSBS scores, H(2, N = 532) = 4.90, p = .086. With Fisher’s 
procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-Wallis) test is not 
significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. These results failed to support Hypothesis 
1, 2, or 3. 
Table 1 
Mean CSBS Scores by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.45 .65 
Control 1.34 .43 
No-prime 1.34 .50 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect cheating/plagiarism scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 532) = 3.91, p = .142. 
With Fisher’s procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-
Wallis) test is not significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. These results failed to 
support Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3. 
Table 2 
Mean Cheating/Plagiarism Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.58 .72 
Control 1.46 .59 
No-prime 1.45 .53 
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Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect deviant behavior scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 532) = .971, p = .616. With 
Fisher’s procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-Wallis) 
test is not significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. These results failed to support 
Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3. 
Table 3 
Mean Deviant Behavior Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.16 .58 
Control 1.09 .24 
No-prime 1.12 .53 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect laziness scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 532) = 3.52, p = .172. With Fisher’s 
procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-Wallis) test is not 
significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4. These results failed to support Hypothesis 
1, 2, or 3. 
Table 4 
Mean Laziness Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.24 .77 
Control 1.13 .47 
No-prime 1.17 .65 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership significantly 
affected lying scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 532) = 6.93, p < .031. As shown in Table 5, scores 
in the experimental group were significantly higher than scores in the control group, but scores in 
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the no-prime group were not significantly different from either of the other group’s scores. These 
results failed to support Hypothesis 1 or 2, but did provide partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
Table 5 
Mean Lying Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.32a .75 
Control 1.15b .32 
No-prime 1.24ab .71 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect alcohol use scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 532) = 3.62, p = .06. With Fisher’s 
procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-Wallis) test is not 
significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 6. These results failed to support Hypothesis 
1, 2, or 3. 
Table 6 
Mean Alcohol Use Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.40 1.16 
Control 1.43 1.24 
No-prime 1.23 .96 
 
Group membership significantly affected MWEP scores, F(2, 529) = 19.99, MSE = 0.16, 
p < .001, η2 = .07, 95% CI [.04, .11]. As shown in Table 7, scores on the MWEP in the 
experimental group were significantly lower than scores on the MWEP in the control group 
(partially supporting Hypothesis 3) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 1). 
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Scores on the MWEP in the control group did not significantly differ from scores on the MWEP 
in the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 2).  
Table 7 
Mean MWEP Scores by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.60a .40 
Control 3.82b .41 
No-prime 3.84b .37 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of self-reliance on the MWEP, F(2, 
529) = 2.19, MSE = .43, p = .113, η2 = .008, 95% CI [.00, .03]. Descriptive statistics are shown 
in Table 8. These results failed to support Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3. 
Table 8 
Mean Self-Reliance Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.81 .69 
Control 3.95 .66 
No-prime 3.92 .61 
 
Group membership significantly affected scores of morality/ethics on the MWEP, F(2, 
529) = 234.01, MSE = .35, p < .001, η2 = .47, 95% CI [.41, .52]. As shown in Table 9, scores in 
the experimental group were significantly lower than scores in the control group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 3) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 1). Scores in 
the control group did not significantly differ from scores in the no-prime group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 2).  
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Table 9 
Mean Morality/Ethics Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.22a .71 
Control 4.34b .55 
No-prime 4.43b .46 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership significantly affected scores of leisure on the MWEP, F(2, 529) = 
76.03, MSE = .40, p < .001, η2 = .22, 95% CI [.16, .28]. As shown in Table 10, scores in the 
experimental group were significantly lower than scores in the control group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 3) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 1). Scores in 
the control group did not significantly differ from scores in the no-prime group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 2). 
Table 10 
Mean Leisure Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 2.96a .72 
Control 3.67b .60 
No-prime 3.66b .55 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership significantly affected scores of centrality of work on the MWEP, F(2, 
529) = 25.68, MSE = .44, p < .001, η2 = .09, 95% CI [.05, .13]. As shown in Table 11, scores in 
the experimental group were significantly lower than scores in the control group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 3) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 1). Scores in 
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the control group did not significantly differ from scores in the no-prime group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 2). 
Table 11 
Mean Centrality of Work Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.77a .79 
Control 4.17b .57 
No-prime 4.23b .60 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of hard work on the MWEP, F(2, 
529) = .421, MSE = .28, p = .657, η2 = .002, 95% CI [.00, .01]. Descriptive statistics are shown 
in Table 12. These results failed to support Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3. 
Table 12 
Mean Hard Work Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 4.05 .50 
Control 4.04 .54 
No-prime 4.09 .54 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of wasted time on the MWEP, F(2, 
529) = .515, MSE = .39, p = .60, η2 = .002, 95% CI [.00, .01]. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 13. These results failed to support Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3. 
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Table 13 
Mean Wasted Time Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.89 .65 
Control 3.95 .63 
No-prime 3.89 .58 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of delay of gratification on the 
MWEP, F(2, 529) = 1.39, MSE = .55, p = .25, η2 = .005, 95% CI [.00, .02]. Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 14. These results failed to support Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3. 
Table 14 
Mean Delay of Gratification Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.82 .74 
Control 3.71 .74 
No-prime 3.71 .75 
 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect SDS scores, F(2, 528) = 1.64, MSE = 0.03, p = 
.194, η2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .02]. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 15. These results 
failed to support Hypothesis 1, 2, or 3.  
Table 15 
Mean SDS Scores by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.47 .19 
Control 1.49 .19 
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Face-to-Face Administration Group 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership significantly 
affected overall CSBS scores, H(2, N = 337) = 16.23, p < .001. As shown in Table 16, scores in 
the no-prime group were significantly higher than in the other two groups, which did not 
significantly differ from each other. These results failed to support Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6.  
Table 16 
Mean CSBS Scores by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.37a .33 
Control 1.39a .03 
No-prime 1.58b .53 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership significantly 
affected cheating/plagiarism scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 337) = 11.22, p = .004. As shown in 
Table 17, scores in the experimental group and control group were significantly lower than 
scores in the no-prime group, while scores in the experimental group did not significantly differ 
from scores in the control group. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 17 
Mean Cheating/Plagiarism Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.50a .43 
Control 1.54a .44 
No-prime 1.72b .63 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. 
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Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership significantly 
affected deviant behavior scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 337) = 13.05, p = .001. As shown in 
Table 18, scores in the experimental group and control group were significantly lower than 
scores in the no-prime group, while scores in the experimental group did not significantly differ 
from scores in the control group. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 18 
Mean Deviant Behavior Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.11a .23 
Control 1.13a .23 
No-prime 1.29b .52 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect laziness scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 337) = 1.06, p = .587. With Fisher’s 
procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-Wallis) test is not 
significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 19. These results failed to support 
Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 19 
Mean Laziness Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.14 .39 
Control 1.21 .51 
No-prime 1.22 .57 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership significantly 
affected lying scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 337) = 14.17, p = .001. As shown in Table 20, 
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scores in the experimental group and control group were significantly lower than scores in the 
no-prime group, while scores in the experimental group did not significantly differ from scores 
in the control group. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 20 
Mean Lying Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.24a .49 
Control 1.14a .29 
No-prime 1.39b .62 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. 
 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated that group membership did not 
significantly affect alcohol use scores on the CSBS, H(2, N = 337) = 5.57, p = .062. With 
Fisher’s procedure, pairwise comparisons are not appropriate if the omnibus (Kruskal-Wallis) 
test is not significant. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 21. These results failed to support 
Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 21 
Mean Alcohol Use Scores on the CSBS by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.25 .91 
Control 1.22 .76 
No-prime 1.64 1.58 
 
Group membership significantly affected MWEP scores, F(2, 334) = 9.28, MSE = 0.11, p 
< .001, η2 = .05, 95% CI [.02, .09]. As shown in Table 22, overall scores on the MWEP in the 
experimental group were significantly lower than those in the control group (partially supporting 
Hypothesis 6) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 4). Scores on the MWEP 
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in the control group did not significantly differ from scores on the MWEP in the no-prime group 
(partially supporting Hypothesis 5). 
Table 22 
Mean MWEP Scores by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.68a .34 
Control 3.86b .32 
No-prime 3.83b .32 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of self-reliance on the MWEP, F(2, 
337) = .236, MSE = .51, p = .790, η2 = .001, 95% CI [.00, .01]. Descriptive statistics are shown 
in Table 23. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 23 
Mean Self-Reliance Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.88 .70 
Control 3.82 .69 
No-prime 3.85 .75 
 
Group membership significantly affected scores of morality/ethics on the MWEP, F(2, 
337) = 131.07, MSE = .30, p < .001, η2 = .44, 95% CI [.36, .50]. As shown in Table 24, scores in 
the experimental group were significantly lower than scores in the control group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 6) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 4). Scores in 
the control group did not significantly differ from scores in the no-prime group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 5).  
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Table 24 
Mean Morality/Ethics Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.47a .71 
Control 4.51b .55 
No-prime 4.49b .46 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership significantly affected scores of leisure on the MWEP, F(2, 337) = 
42.88, MSE = .36, p < .001, η2 = .20, 95% CI [.13, .27]. As shown in Table 25, scores in the 
experimental group were significantly lower than scores in the control group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 6) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 4). Scores in 
the control group did not significantly differ from scores in the no-prime group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 5). 
Table 25 
Mean Leisure Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.00a .69 
Control 3.62b .55 
No-prime 3.66b .54 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership significantly affected scores of centrality of work on the MWEP, F(2, 
337) = 10.57, MSE = .38, p < .001, η2 = .06, 95% CI [.02, .11]. As shown in Table 26, scores in 
the experimental group were significantly lower than scores in the control group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 6) and the no-prime group (partially supporting Hypothesis 4). Scores in 
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the control group did not significantly differ from scores in the no-prime group (partially 
supporting Hypothesis 5). 
Table 26 
Mean Centrality of Work Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.92a .76 
Control 4.24b .52 
No-prime 4.26b .54 
Note.  Means sharing a letter in their superscript are not 
significantly different at the .05 level according to a Fisher’s 
LSD test. 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of hard work on the MWEP, F(2, 
337) = 1.62, MSE = .23, p = .199, η2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .04]. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 27. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 27 
Mean Hard Work Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 4.14 .47 
Control 4.07 .45 
No-prime 4.03 .50 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of wasted time on the MWEP, F(2, 
337) = 1.25, MSE = .33, p = .287, η2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .03]. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 28. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
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Table 28 
Mean Wasted Time Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 4.06 .62 
Control 4.02 .56 
No-prime 3.94 .55 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect scores of delay of gratification on the 
MWEP, F(2, 337) = .125, MSE = .58, p = .882, η2 = .001, 95% CI [.00, .01]. Descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 29. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4, 5, or 6. 
Table 29 
Mean Delay of Gratification Scores on the MWEP by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 3.67 .81 
Control 3.62 .80 
No-prime 3.63 .65 
 
Group membership did not significantly affect SDS scores, F(2, 334) = 2.07, MSE = 
0.04, p = .127, η2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .04]. As shown in Table 30, scores on the SDS differed 
very little from each other. These results failed to support Hypothesis 4 and 6, but did provide 
support for Hypothesis 5.  
Table 30 
Mean SDS Scores by Priming Group 
Group Mean SD 
Experimental 1.46 .18 
Control 1.47 .21 
No-prime 1.51 .17 
 
 CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION 
 Review of the results obtained in this study reveals some consistent patterns among both 
the online administration group and the face-to-face administration group. First, scores on the 
counterproductive scale were unaffected by the priming measures except in the face-to-face 
administration group in which both the experimental and control groups displayed lower scores 
(the opposite of what was expected) than the no-prime group. Secondly, scores on the work ethic 
scale were affected by the priming measures for both administration groups. As expected, the 
experimental group received lower work ethic scores than the other two groups. Finally, social 
desirability was unaffected by either of the priming measures for either administration group. To 
summarize, the experimental priming measure was consistently effective in compelling 
participants to respond more honestly about their (lower) work ethic, but it did not compel 
participants to respond more honestly about their (higher) counterproductive student behaviors.  
Neither the overall CSBS scores nor the subscale scores displayed significant support for 
the hypotheses. Only the lying subscale in the online administration group was affected by the 
moral self-reflective prime, however this subscale consists of only one item, limiting inferences 
that can be made from these results. In comparing response patterns associated with online 
administration and face-to-face administration, Norman et al. (2010) found that online 
administration yielded larger standard deviations and a greater number of central and extreme 
responses (responses at -1, 0, and 1). In the current study, only the experimental group answering 
the CSBS displayed results similar to those reported by Norman et al. Although the standard 
deviation (s = .33), skewness (g1 = 1.42), and kurtosis (g2 = 2.05) remained at reasonable levels 
in the face-to-face group, the standard deviation (s = .65), skewness (S = 4.09), and kurtosis (K = 
24.03) for the online group were much more extreme. Perhaps these extreme scores were 
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influenced by the same factors that influenced Norman et al.’s (2010) results; however, that does 
not explain why scores on the MWEP and SDS remained relatively stable across administration 
groups. A more plausible observation may be that items on the counterproductive behavior scale 
evoked more diffuse responses from participants compared to the work ethic and social 
desirability scales, and this combined with online administration engendered more central and 
extreme responses and yielded larger standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis in the 
distribution. Specifically, the experimental (i.e., morality) prime elicited the most variable 
responses in the CSBS distribution; however, group membership did not significantly affect 
scores for the online administration group. 
Respondents have been shown to provide more socially desirable responses in face-to-
face surveys as opposed to self-administration (e.g., online, postal) surveys (Presser & Stinson, 
1998; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996), even when controlling for order and contextual effects 
(Bowling, Bond, Jenkinson, & Lamping, 1999; Lyons, Wareham, Lucas, Price, Williams, & 
Hutchings, 1999). As face-to-face administration involves social interaction respondents may 
take social norms into effect, resulting in social desirability bias, more specifically the over-
reporting of desirable behaviors and under-reporting of undesirable behaviors (Bowling, 2005). 
The mere presence of an interviewer/administrator can be distracting to respondents and may 
elicit such self-presentation tactics; therefore, one benefit of online self-administration modes is 
that they circumvent this source of bias. Moreover, the self-administration of surveys can 
increase a respondents’ willingness to disclose sensitive information as opposed to face-to-face 
administration (Bowling, 2005). Thus, the combination of offering greater anonymity and 
negating the social presence engenders more accurate reporting, particularly when sensitive 
topics are of interest (Parker & Dewey, 2000; Pruchno & Hayden, 2000; Siemiatycki, 1979). It 
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could be argued that admitting to counterproductive behaviors is sensitive information, as 
individuals may be apprehensive to report such behavior. Thus, considering that face-to-face 
administration results in greater social desirability biases, online administration results in more 
accurate responses when dealing with sensitive information, and online administration results in 
a greater number of central and extreme responses, it seems reasonable that CSBS scores in the 
face-to-face group were significantly lower in the experimental and control groups as opposed to 
the no-prime group. 
An additional point of interest is the finding that CSBS scores for the experimental and 
control groups in the face-to-face administration were both significantly lower than those of the 
no-prime group. Specifically, these results were evident in the subscales of cheating/plagiarism, 
deviant behavior, and lying, as well as in the overall CSBS results. One theory is that the 
experimental and control groups became more cognitively aware or “on edge” after having to 
complete a mentally taxing priming measure. Combining this with the idea that face-to-face 
administration results in more social desirability bias, it is possible that heightened levels of 
cognitive awareness amplify the influence of the administration method (thus engendering 
greater degrees of social desirability). Another possible explanation is that because the 
experimental and control groups completed a longer overall measure than the no-prime group, 
these two groups may have suffered from some type of testing effect (e.g., testing fatigue). 
However, that does not explain why the experimental and control group responses appeared to be 
more thoughtful (evidenced by more socially desirable responses). In any case, it appears that 
some aspect of the priming measures served to amplify the influence of face-to-face 
administration in both the experimental and the control groups, resulting in greater social 
desirability bias. 
	   	  	   44 
With regard to work ethic, participants responded as expected, with MWEP scores in the 
control group and the no-prime group being comparable while those in the experimental group 
were significantly lower than the other two groups. This illustrates that the moral self-reflective 
prime effectively influenced both the intuitive and rationalistic aspects of decision-making when 
admitting to lower work ethic. Specifically, the moral self-reflective prime consistently 
influenced the subscales of morality/ethics, leisure, and centrality of work, but it did not affect 
self-reliance, hard work, wasted time, and delay of gratification. As these results illustrate a 
difference between the subscales when admitting to lower scores, it is possible that either a) the 
subscales that were not affected were too sensitive, or b) the overall MWEP results are more 
representative of true student work ethic in the experimental group as opposed to the other 
groups. Given that scores on the overall MWEP and three of the seven subscales were 
consistently lower in the experimental group than in the other two groups, it seems reasonable to 
infer that participants were affected by the moral self-reflective prime when answering the 
MWEP. Thus, as opposed to illustrating a failure of the moral self-reflective prime, it is plausible 
that the experimental group’s MWEP scores are more representative of students’ perceptions of 
their own work ethic as opposed to what was illustrated in the other groups, with students 
honestly believing themselves to have higher self-reliance, hard work, wasted time, and delay of 
gratification than morality/ethics, leisure, and centrality of work.  
This pattern of results also suggests that work ethic is a less sensitive topic than 
counterproductive behavior. One plausible observation based on this finding is that the moral 
self-reflective prime did not consistently influence the intuitive and rationalistic aspects of 
decision-making when dealing with sensitive topics (i.e., counterproductive behavior) but was 
effective when applied to a more socially acceptable construct (i.e., work ethic). This begs the 
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question: is work ethic not a sensitive construct? Psychological constructs are considered 
sensitive when they have socially acceptable alternatives, are threatening, and have different 
psychological costs associated with disclosure (Dalal, 2013). In Dalal’s (2013) dissertation, a 
measure of counterproductive workplace behaviors was used to represent a sensitive construct. 
Even though there is no mention of work ethic being a sensitive construct, it does have socially 
acceptable alternatives and could be threatening in certain contexts (e.g., when completing a job 
application). It should also be noted that Dalal’s (2013) findings suggest that indirect questioning 
yields the best results with sensitive constructs, however as mentioned before, indirect 
questioning may lead to lower construct validity (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Holden & Jackson, 
1985). However, it is plausible that students do not perceive work ethic to be as sensitive a 
construct when pertaining to an academic context.  
Finally, with regard to social desirability, scores on the SDS in the experimental, control, 
and no-prime groups failed to significantly differ for either administration group. As the 
experimental prime was intended to reduce intentional response distortion (i.e., social 
desirability), it did not perform as intended in this aspect of the study. However, these results are 
nevertheless informative. In light of the finding that the experimental prime did not mitigate the 
influence of social desirability when reporting counterproductive behaviors, it is not surprising 
that scores on the SDS did not differ across groups. The influence of social desirability was 
clearly present when participants responded to the CSBS; thus, it follows that social desirability 
was equally present when responding to the SDS.  
The most noteworthy results of this study are that participants in both administration 
groups reported lower work ethic after completing the experimental prime. These findings 
suggest that a discrepancy exists in the willingness to admit to lower work ethic as opposed to 
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higher counterproductive behaviors, and that this difference likely stems from the relative 
sensitivity of these constructs. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of employing of a 
moral self-reflective prime that could potentially be used to combat response distortion in 
selection contexts. However, as a convenience sample of undergraduate students were used, the 
generalizability of the findings is somewhat limited. First, the average age of participants was 
18.8 years, with the majority (77.2%) of students being in their first year of school. Even though 
the personality tests used were structured to accommodate non-working students (e.g., the CSBS 
assessed counterproductive student behaviors rather than counterproductive work behaviors), 
most of the students had only worked during the summer months if at all. Second, course credit 
was the only incentive offered for completing the study. As mentioned by Ones et al. (2007), lab 
studies of directed faking are affected by instructions to fake, but real-life situations are not 
affected in the same way. If this study had used a sample of actual job applicants, it is presumed 
that the incentive of obtaining a job would also have affected the sensitivity of the constructs.  
 Future research should focus on the sensitivity of these constructs and seek to develop 
primes that are potent enough to affect both the intuitive and rationalistic aspects of the decision 
making process. The results of this study neither supported nor unsupported Goffin and Boyd’s 
(2009) faking decision tree, but they did illustrate that construct sensitivity can be a contributing 
factor when weighing the severity of a decision. Future research should examine why 
counterproductive behavior appears to be a sensitive construct to report but work ethic does not. 
Does this mean that admitting to lower work ethic is viewed as more socially acceptable? Future 
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research efforts should also focus on job applicants, as the necessity for a job in terms of survival 
would greatly skew the sensitivity of a construct.  
 As mentioned earlier, Mazar et al.’s (2008a) Ten Commandments research provided 
significant insight into the current study. However, several authors argued that the study by 
Mazar and associates overlooked several key factors with regard to motivation to fake. As noted 
in a commentary by Rick and Loewenstein (2008), evidence suggests that people who find 
themselves in a place of desperation and believe that dishonest behavior is the only option are 
more likely to lie, cheat, and steal (e.g., Chang & Schultz, 1990; Schepanski & Kelsey, 1990). 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory illustrated the concept of loss aversion and they 
coined the term “hypermotivation” to denote a visceral state in which individuals engage in 
behaviors that would normally be viewed as unacceptable in an effort to avoid loss. Loss 
aversion implies that the motivation to avoid loss is approximately two to three times greater 
than the motivation to obtain a gain of equivalent value. Relating to the current study, this 
“hypermotivation” could be exemplified in job applicants who are desperate for a job and willing 
to take part in unacceptable behavior to ensure that they do not incur future loss.  
 In a response by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008b), it is suggested that if dishonesty lies 
primarily in motivation and standard rational dishonesty (i.e., dishonesty that stems from an 
explicit analysis of external cost and benefit), the benefits of being dishonest must exceed the 
costs. Therefore, they propose that the best solution is to shift the imbalance so that the costs 
associated with dishonesty are greater than the benefits by manipulating external factors, 
specifically, increasing the probability of being caught and/or the severity of the punishment. An 
interesting suggestion for future research is that employees whose on-the-job performance 
dramatically differs from their personality test responses (e.g., employees’ test responses imply 
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that they would effectively assume leadership roles but in actuality they consistently shrink from 
leadership roles) could be challenged regarding the honesty of their responses (Goffin & Boyd, 
2009). If organizations publicize this practice to job applicants it could significantly impact the 
honesty of their test responses. A study by Robie, Brown, and Beaty (2007) showed that test 
takers show genuine concern with regard to being confronted about their dishonesty. If future 
research finds that moral self-reflective primes are not consistently effective against sensitive 
constructs such as counterproductive behaviors, challenging employees’ honesty may be a 
potential area of future research. However, the major issue with this method is the ethicality of 
confronting someone about his or her honesty in the workplace. 
 One final but very important note mentioned by Mazar and colleagues (2008b) is that 
dishonesty is complex and may be driven by a variety of factors, many of which were not 
addressed in their initial study. Their study emphasized the role of two distinct but interrelated 
mechanisms of self-concept maintenance: categorization and attention to standards. With 
categorization, people can categorize their actions into more compatible terms and create 
rationalizations for them. In addition, Mazar et al.’s response (2008b) illustrated that other 
factors contribute to dishonesty, as shown in Figure 2. Rick and Loewenstein (2008) emphasized 
that the role of motivation in dishonesty has two sources: competition and avoidance or recoup 
of losses. As mentioned earlier about how dishonesty is more apparent when someone is in a 
desperate position, this same motivation can increase a person’s propensity for self-serving 
categorization, increasing self-concept maintenance dishonesty. Also, motivation for dishonesty 
can have a direct effect through standard rational dishonesty, leading to a point where the 
perceived external costs and benefits of dishonesty trump maintaining an honest self-concept. In 
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summary, future researchers should consider the factors included in Figure 2 in developing 
methods to reduce dishonesty. 
Figure 2  
An Extended Framework for Dishonesty 
 
Conclusion 
This study sought to create a tangible solution to faking on personality tests by using 
moral self-reflective priming to influence the dual processes of decision-making. The present 
results suggest that moral self-reflective priming may effectively reduce faking so long as the 
topics of interest are not overly sensitive in nature. When the benefits of being dishonest exceed 
the cost, individuals will behave dishonestly. Therefore, future research needs to focus on 
creating ways to remind participants that the costs of dishonesty exceeds the benefits, either 
through more potent moral self-reflective primes or via other methods. Future research should 
also take the sensitivity of the construct into account as well as consider one’s motivation for 
	   	  	   50 
being dishonest. Overall, the moral self-reflective prime developed for this study showed 
promise, but needs to be greatly improved to compensate for the effects of sensitive constructs 
and motivation to fake.
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 Appendix A. Priming Measure (Experimental Group) 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and choose the 
three words (or more) that best answer the corresponding statement. 
 
1. What are some of the characteristics of a person who lies or deceives people?  
Honest Weak Hurtful Disrespectful Trustworthy 
Undependable Considerate Dependable Egotistic Courageous 
Selfish Empathetic Greedy Caring Manipulative 
 
2. What are some of the characteristics of a person who is truthful and upfront? 
Honest Weak Hurtful Disrespectful Trustworthy 
Undependable Considerate Dependable Egotistic Courageous 
Selfish Empathetic Greedy Caring Manipulative 
 
3. What are some good examples of immoral characteristics? 
Self-restraint Pretentious Irresponsible Altruistic Dependable 
Selfish Self-Centered Trustworthy Modest Cheating 
Charitable Courteous Truthful Deceptive Faking 
 
4. Imagine the person you hope to become. What characteristics does that person have? 
Dependable Self-restraint Altruistic Irresponsible Pretentious 
Cheating Selfish Modest Trustworthy Self-Centered 
Faking Charitable Deceptive Truthful Courteous 
 
5. Which of the following characteristics would your parents detest the most? 
Self-restraint Altruistic Pretentious Irresponsible Dependable 
Selfish Modest Self-Centered Trustworthy Cheating 
Charitable Deceptive Courteous Truthful Faking 
 
6. What are some good examples of moral characteristics? 
Irresponsible Dependable Self-restraint Altruistic Pretentious 
Trustworthy Cheating Selfish Modest Self-Centered 
Truthful Faking Charitable Deceptive Courteous 
 
7. What are some characteristics a person must have for you to disrespect them? 
Altruistic Irresponsible Dependable Pretentious Self-restraint 
Modest Trustworthy Cheating Self-Centered Selfish 
Deceptive Truthful Faking Courteous Charitable 
 
8. From the previous question, which of those characteristics apply to you?  
Irresponsible Dependable Self-restraint Altruistic Pretentious 
Trustworthy Cheating Selfish Modest Self-Centered 
Truthful Faking Charitable Deceptive Courteous 
 Appendix B: Priming Measure (Control Group) 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and choose the 
three words (or more) that best answer the corresponding statement. 
1. Which of the following are variations of the color red? 
Cream Azure Scarlet Indigo Auburn 
Harlequin Rust Khaki Maize Teal 
Celeste Olive Asparagus Vermillion Aureolin 
2. What of the following are variations of the biological family of Felidae (i.e. Felines)? 
Steppe polecat Cougar Shrew Saurischia Margay 
Ocelot Dingo Leopard Anole Lynx 
European mink Vole Lion Anthdon Dilong 
3. Which of the following are regions of the human brain? Thoracic Trachea Bronchioles Optic chiasm Endocardium 
Myocardium Pulvinar Hippocampus Alveoli Basal ganglia 
Thalamus Epicardium Amygdala Cerebellum Pleura 
4. Which of the following are famous psychologists? 
Edwin Hubble Tycho Brahe Carl Jung Walter Baade B.F. Skinner 
Carl Sagan Albert Bandura Johann Bode Fritz Zwicky Jean Piaget 
Frank Drake Anna Freud Kurt Lewin Ivan Pavlov Otto Struve 
5. Which of the following are famous authors? 
Sebastian Loeb Lewis Carroll A.J. Foyt Walt Whitman Jackie Stewart 
Ian Fleming Ayrton Senna J.K. Rowling Larry McMurty Alex Zanardi 
Mark Donohue Lewis Hamilton Mark Twain Jane Austen James Hunt 
6. Which of the following are fruit? 
Pumpkin Tomato Pawpaw Olive Nutmeg 
Chaya Beet Turnip Catsear Orache 
Pea Squash Amaranth Cherry Tatsoi 
7. Which of the following are countries? 
Dmitrovsk Dubai Osa Algeria Chad 
Moscow Mikhaylov Zhirnovsk Sweden Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyzstan Ostrov Vysokovsk Iran Brazil 
8. Which of the following people, who have been featured on US currency, were US presidents? 
G. Cleveland A. Hamilton F.D. Roosevelt M. Hillegas J. Monroe 
S. B. Anthony B. Franklin D. Webster T.H. Benton U.S. Grant 
D. Eisenhower W.Wilson W. McKinley J. Marshall S.P. Chase 
 Appendix C: Informed Consent Document 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY 
GREENVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, 27858 
 






Dr. Jennifer Bowler 
104 Rawl 
Department of Psychology 
Harriot College 
East Carolina University 





You have been asked to participate in a research study being conducted by Dr. 




During the study you will complete several survey measures.  After the study is 




All information collected about you will be completely confidential. Your name will 
not be connected with any of the responses you provide on any of the measures. 
Potential Risks 
and Discomforts There are no known risks to participating in this study. 
Compensation For completing the study you will receive ½ credit toward your research participation requirement for PSYC1000/PSYC1060. 
Freedom to 
withdraw 
Participation is completely voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or 
withdraw at any time. There is no penalty of any kind for either non-participation or 
withdrawal.  However, if you choose to withdraw from the study before you complete 
the measures you will not receive your research participation credit. 
Availability of 
results 
A summary of these results will be available from the researcher on or about 
12/31/2014. The summary will include only aggregated (i.e., combined) data for the 
entire sample. 
No individual results will be available. 
Investigator 
availability 
The investigator will be available to answer any questions concerning this research, 
now or in the future.  You may contact the investigators, Dr. Jennifer Bowler via 
phone (252-328-6474) or email (bowlerj@ecu.edu). If you have questions about your 
rights as a research subject, you may call the University and Medical Center 
Institutional Review Board at phone number 252-744-2914.   
 ☐  I agree to participate in this study.  
 ☐ I do not agree to participate in this study. 
 Appendix D: Debriefing Form 	  Debriefing	  Form	  	  Study:	  Personality	  and	  Reasoning	  Processes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Please	  read	  the	  information	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  your	  participation	  in	  this	  study.	  This	  study	  investigates	  whether	  perceptions	  of	  morality	  influence	  impression	  management	  behavior.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  risk	  involved	  in	  participating	  in	  this	  study.	  Your	  participation	  will	  enable	  psychologists	  to	  better	  identify	  strategies	  that	  may	  encourage	  the	  provision	  of	  objective	  responses	  to	  self-­‐report	  measures.	  Other	  than	  noting	  your	  participation	  in	  the	  study,	  you	  will	  not	  be	  identified	  and	  your	  responses	  cannot	  be	  linked	  to	  you.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  you	  have	  any	  further	  questions	  regarding	  this	  study,	  please	  contact	  Dr.	  Jennifer	  Bowler	  via	  email	  (bowlerj@ecu.edu)	  or	  by	  phone	  (252-­‐328-­‐6474).	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